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UNCOVERING THE "INVISIBLE" PROFILE OF
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION:
INSIGHTS FROM FLORIDA
Neil Vidmar*
Paul Lee**
Kara MacKillop***
Kieran McCarthy****
and
Gerald McGwin *****

INTRODUCTION

Around the year 2000, physicians and health care providers began
experiencing difficulties in obtaining or affording professional liability2
insurance,1 a problem that also arose in the mid-1970s and mid-1980s.
In some states, insurers have either discontinued writing new policies
or have left the market altogether, making coverage unavailable at
any price for some physicians. 3 In other states, the cost of malpractice
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1. For background information, see Press Release, American Medical Association (AMA),
Massachusetts Becomes 20th State in a Medical Liability Crisis (June 14, 2004), available at
3 964
.html [hereinafter AMA Press Release]. See
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/1
also Neil Vidmar & Leigh Anne Brown, Tort Reform and the Medical Liability Insurance Crisis
in Mississippi: Diagnosing the Disease and Prescribing a Remedy, 22 Miss. C. L. REV. 9, 46
(2002): cf W. Kip Vicusi & Patricia Born, Medical Malpractice Insurance in the Wake of Liability
Reform, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 464 (1995).
2. David M. Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283, 284 (2004).
*

3.

GOVERNOR'S SELECT TASK FORCE ON HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE

(Jan. 29, 2003), available at http://www.doh.state.fl.us/myflorida/DOH-Large-Final%2Book.pdf
[hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
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insurance has risen dramatically in the last four years. As in the past, 4
this recurring problem has been labeled a "crisis," prompting calls for
"tort reform."'5 The problems have far-reaching consequences for the
affordability and accessibility of health care, as well as the interests of
persons who suffer injuries as a result of medical negligence.
Task forces and legislative hearings have been held in numerous
states (including but not limited to Florida, 6 North Carolina, 7 Mississippi,8 and Pennsylvania 9 ) and in a congressional House subcommittee 10 in attempts to better understand the problem and to devise
solutions to the liability insurance crisis. Some states have adopted
caps on non-economic damages and other reforms in an attempt to
deal with the problem.1 1
Debate about the nature, extent, and causes of this crisis is bitter.
Proponents of tort reform, particularly health care providers and business organizations, blame the tort system as the principal culprit. 12
They assert that both the frequency of claims and the average number
of medical negligence claims payments have increased over the years
and that juries tend to favor plaintiffs and give excessive verdict
awards.' 3 Further, they believe that the "shadow effect" from large
jury awards inflates the size of settlements because the risk of being
subjected to excessive awards forces insurers to settle cases that may
otherwise be defensible. 1 4 Tort reform proponents also aver that the
contingent fee system provides a "lottery" effect that contributes to
4. See generally Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin,

"The

Impact That ItHas Had Is Between

People's Ears": Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs' Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 453

(2000).
5. See AMA Press Release, supra note 1.
6. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3.

7. See, e.g., North Carolina Society of Anesthesiologists, 2004 Legislative Summary, Medical
Liability Reform, at http://www.ncsoa.com/2004legsummary.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2005); Patricia Yancey, Legislative Update: Medical Malpractice- What's at Stake?, Friends of Residents in
Long Term Care (Newsletter Fall 2003), http://www.forltc.org/PDF%20Fall%2003%2ONews
letter.pdf.
8. Reed Branson, HealthcareCrisis Feeds Mississippi Tort Reform Fight (Aug. 21, 2002), available at http:l/www.stateline.org/statelinel?pa=story&sa=showStorylnfo&id=255325.
9. Highlights from the Senate Appropriations Committee Budget Hearings (Feb. 24, 2004),
available at http://www.pasenategop.com/news/budghrgs/022404hearings.htm.
10. See generally The Medical Liability Insurance Crisis: A Review of the Situation in Pennsylvania: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on

Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. (2003).
11. Adam D. Glassman, The Imposition of FederalCaps in Medical Malpractice Liability Actions: Will They Cure the Current Crisis in Health Care?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 417, 462 (2004).
12. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Jr. & Evan Thomas, Civil Wars, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 2003, at 42,
46-48. See also Vidmar & Brown, supra note 1, at 46.
13. See CONG. WATCH, PUB. CITIZEN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE BRIEFING BOOK: CHALLENGING THE MISLEADING CLAIMS OF THE DOCTORS' LOBBY (2004).
14. Id.
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the filing of frivolous lawsuits, since some insurers may15settle suits for
an amount less than the costs of mounting a defense.
In contrast, consumer groups and the plaintiffs' bar say that the
problem is not with the tort system. 16 In their view, the problem has
several sources. First, they believe that there is a high incidence of
negligent medical mistakes leading to claims and serious injuries with
large economic losses incurred by the patients. 17 Second, they contest
the assertions that claim frequency is increasing and that the awards to
plaintiffs are inappropriate.' 8 Third, they contend that the real cause
of rising malpractice premiums lies with insurer underpricing of policies in the past, poor insurer investments, and downturns in the business cycle.' 9
Angry rhetoric and poorly substantiated claims often substitute for
systematic data that could provide a picture of what actually occurs
when patients make claims against medical providers. Moreover, experience with tort reforms of various kinds has shown that reforms are
often ineffective, 20 or worse, produce results that are counterproductive. 2 1 Attempts to adequately understand the problem and promote
effective solutions require an understanding of how the medical malpractice tort litigation system actually operates. Yet, neither researchers nor legislators have a complete profile of the tort system that can
identify what occurs at its various stages. For example, as noted
above, proponents of tort reform assert that the number of claims has
been rising along with the amounts of damages in both jury verdicts
and settlements. 22 Opponents of tort reform dispute this view, arguing that when figures are adjusted for population increases, numbers
15. See generally
(1979).

JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN

16. See generally CONG. WATCH, supra note 13. See also CTR. FOR JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY,
The Eight Biggest Myths About Medical Malpractice-and How to Respond (2003), available at

http://centerjd.org/private/papers/CJD-MedMalBriefingBook.php

(on file with the authors).

17. See generally INST. OF MED., To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000); Lucian Leape, Institute of Medicine Medical Error Figures Are
Not Exaggerated, 284 JAMA 95 (2000).
18. See generally CONG. WATCH, supra note 13.
19. Id.; see also CTR. FOR JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY. supra note 16.
20. See generally NEIL VIDMAR ET AL., AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF A LEGISLATED PROCEDURAL

REFORM:

COURT-BASED

MANAGEMENT

OF MEDICAL

MALPRACTICE LITIGATION

(1992); Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races": The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law

Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REV. 207 (1990); David M. Studdert et al., The Jury Is Still In:
Florida's Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan After a Decade, 25 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. 499 (2000).

21. Glassman, supra note 11, at 462.
22. See generally, e.g., Grace Vandecruze, Has the Tide Begun to Turn for Medical Malpractice?, HEALTH LAW., Dec. 2002, at 15.
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of physicians, and inflation, litigation has remained relatively static
over the past decade. 23 As a second example, proponents of reforms
point to large jury verdicts, 24 but opponents argue that the awards are
25
commensurate to plaintiff losses.
Until now, obtaining a systematic profile has proven difficult. Pretrial settlements are typically confidential and researchers cannot gain
access to what actually resulted from the litigation. Moreover, if
claims are settled without formal litigation they never appear in public
court records even though such cases may account for substantial insurer losses. This is true for cases resulting in payment to claimants
and for claims resulting in no payment; the latter still result in transaction costs for the defense. Similarly, jury verdicts for plaintiffs may be
settled for lesser amounts in post-trial negotiations but the settlements
usually remain invisible as confidential post-trial agreements between
26
the parties.
In this Article, we begin to piece together a basic profile of the
medical malpractice tort system, including its "invisible" parts, over a
fourteen-year period from 1990 through 2003. Our efforts are centered on the State of Florida, one of the states labeled a crisis state by
the American Medical Association. 27 A Florida statute, dating back
to 1975, has required medical liability insurers to submit detailed reports of all closed claims to the Florida Department of Health. 28
These reports form the backbone of this Article but they are supplemented by a second data source, an archive that we have constructed
from jury verdict reports compiled by Westlaw. 29 The Florida closed
claims data have been used by other researchers in various investiga-

23. See generally Mitchell J. Nathanson, It's the Economy (and Combined Ratio), Stupid: Examining the Medical MalpracticeLiability Myth and the Factors Criticalto Reform, 108 PENN. ST.
L. REV. 1077 (2004).

24. See Does Limitless Litigation Restrict Access to Health Care? Oversight Hearing on Health
Care Litigation Reform Before Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (June 12, 2002) (statement of the American Medical Association
(AMA)), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/udiciary/hju80l93.000/hju80193_0.
htm.
25. See CONG. WATCH, supra note 13.

26. See generally Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for Medical Malpractice and Post-Verdict
Adjustments of those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 265 (1999) (detailing some data bearing on
post-trial adjustments).
27. See AMA, supra note 1.
28. The records were formerly compiled and held by the Florida Department of Insurance.
29. These jury verdict reports compiled by Westlaw are found by accessing Westlaw, All
Databases, U.S. State Materials, Florida, Jury Instructions Jury Verdicts & Judgments, Florida
Jury Verdicts Plus, Standard Search: Terms and Connectors: Med Mal.
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tions about medical malpractice litigation, but the previous studies are
30
now dated or are focused on a subset of medical malpractice cases.
Part II summarizes the medical malpractice debate and some controversial attempts to describe the medical malpractice litigation profile in Florida that was submitted to the 2003 Governor's Select Task
Force on Healthcare and Professional Liability Insurance (Task
Force). 3 1 In Part III, we describe the data sources we used to develop
our profile of Florida medical malpractice litigation. Then, in Parts
IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII, we report the basic findings bearing on the
litigation profile.
II.

THE CONTROVERSY OVER MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION

A.

The General Problem

In the current crisis, proponents of tort reform in Florida 3 2 and elsewhere 33 have stated that the number of medical negligence claims has
increased. Some critics assert a continual rise while others suggest a
spike beginning in the late 1990s. 34 These claims may or may not be
true, but often they are made in the absence of reliable information.
Assume, for the sake of argument, that there has been an increase in
claims. There are many possible explanations. 35 One is that there has
been an increase in litigiousness, that is, an increased willingness of
injured patients and their lawyers to pursue claims, regardless of
merit. An alternative explanation to meritless litigation is that in the
past, there were just as many incidents of true negligence but plaintiffs
or their lawyers were, for whatever reasons, reluctant to pursue the
claims. Still another hypothesis is that there is an actual increase in
incidents of negligence. However, even if total frequency of negligent
outcomes has increased, it might be due to increases in the patient
population or the number of practicing physicians. In such an event,
the incidence of medical negligence per capita for patients or physicians may have remained stable.
A second assertion is that the amounts of jury awards have increased. This alleged increase, it is claimed, also has two resultant
30. See, e.g.,

FRANK SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

(1993); David Nye et

al., The Causes of the Medical Malpractice Crisis: An Analysis of Claim Data and Insurance

Company Finances, 76 GEO. L.J. 1495 (1988); Studdert et al., supra note 20, at 499.
31. See generally TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3.

32. Id. at 1-5, 33-144.
33. See id. at 6-23; Taylor & Thomas, supra note 12, at 42, 46-48; Vidmar & Brown, supra
note 1.
34. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 15.

35. See Nye et al., supra note 30, at 1560; Vidmar & Brown, supra note 1, at 46.
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"shadow effects." First, tort system critics say that the amounts of settlements have increased because jury awards serve as a standard of
expected values of claims: as amounts of verdicts increase, the expected value of settlements increase because settlement negotiations
center around likely trial outcomes. 36 The second "shadow effect" relates to frequency of claims. Large awards, it is believed, increase the
likelihood of frivolous claims among patients and their lawyers looking for a "lottery jackpot" suggested by the jury verdicts. 3 7 In contrast, one alternative explanation is that the costs of medical injuries
have increased. Another hypothesis is that there has been a change in
the types of claims, such that there are more cases with severe injuries
and consequent economic losses and fewer cases with less severe injuries and losses. This last hypothesis, if true, could account for an increase in mean payments even if the total frequency of claims
remained unchanged.
A related issue involves the transaction costs of defending claims.
Even if claimants are unsuccessful and ultimately receive no payment,
liability insurers incur legal costs defending such claims. Insurers have
said that their transaction costs have increased, another element negatively affecting the financial well being of insurers. 38 Procedural
stages in the dispute resolution process are often ignored or underplayed in public discussion about transaction costs. The point at
which disputes are resolved affects transaction costs. Normally, a case
that proceeds to trial will incur more legal transaction costs than one
that is settled without resort to trial. 3 9 Claims settled without the
claimant even filing a lawsuit should result in still lower transaction
costs than a settlement after a lawsuit. While there are academic writings and some empirical research on the various resolution stages of

36. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 71 (Doctor Richard Anderson's Testimony).
37. Taylor & Thomas, supra note 12, at 42, 46-48. See generally PETER HUBER, LIABILITY:
THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEoUENCES (1988).
38. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 48; Med. Mutual Ins. Co. of N.C., Presentation to

the North Carolina Blue Ribbon Task Force on Medical Malpractice (2003) (unpublished presentation on file with author).
39. There might be occasional exceptions to this general rule. Defense lawyers might expend
more time negotiating a pretrial settlement than they would if the case went directly to a short
trial.
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disputes, 40 there is little information about these processes in medical
4
malpractice litigation. '

Perhaps other explanations explain the conflicting positions in the
liability insurance debate about frequency of claims, amounts of payments, and transaction costs. The various alternative hypotheses are
not necessarily mutually exclusive; all could be correct to some degree. The above discussion is intended to highlight the complexity of
the issues and set the stage for a neutral investigation of the facts. A

first step in addressing the controversy is to determine whether, and to
what degree, the number of claims, the mean and median payouts,

and insurers' transaction costs changed in recent years.
B.

Recent Attempts at Describing the Medical Malpractice
Litigation Profile in Florida

The State of Florida serves as an example for the medical malpractice controversy. In the midst of rising concerns about the availability
of liability insurance, in 2002 Governor Jeb Bush formed the Governor's Select Task Force on Health Care Professional Liability Insurance that held hearings across the state. 42 On January 29, 2003, the
Task Force submitted a 341-page report accompanied by thirteen
volumes of presentations, letters, and testimony. 43 The Task Force
Report documents the history of medical liability insurance problems
and tort reforms in Florida from 1975 to 2003. 44 In addition to surveying the various claims and counterclaims, the Report also discusses
two attempts to describe the medical malpractice litigation profile of
Florida. 45 Both reports were commissioned by interested parties: the
40. See generally

HERBERT KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS

AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY

(2004); William Felsteiner et al., The Emergence
and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming... , 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 631
(1980-81); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093
(1996); Herbert Kritzer et al., The Aftermath of Injury: Societal Factors in Compensation Seeking
in Canada and the United States, 25 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 449 (1991).
41. See NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY 69-92 (1995).
42. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 56, 145.
43. See generally id.
44. Id. at 33-56.
45. The Task Force Report describes several surveys undertaken by The Florida Hospital Association, the Florida Medical Association, and Floridians for Quality Affordable Healthcare
that purported to describe, among other issues, how physicians had changed their practice in
relation to fear of being sued, the incidence of being sued, and other responses to the perceived
threats, including "defensive medicine." Defensive medicine refers to unnecessary tests undertaken to avoid any claim that they had not exercised professional responsibility. In 2002, the
Florida Medical Association conducted a survey that purported to describe how physicians had
changed their practice to cope with the high cost and lack of available medical negligence insurance. These surveys suffer from the problems often associated with surveys, particularly unrepFEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
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Florida Hospital Association and the Florida Academy of Trial Lawyers. 46 Both reports utilized the closed-claim databases that were
compiled and maintained by the Florida Department of Insurance,
which we use in the present research. 47
The Florida Hospital Association hired Milliman USA, Inc. to evaluate the insurance problem and formulate recommendations to be
used in tort reform. 48 The Milliman Report examined data from the
Florida closed-claim files as well as from the National Practitioner
Data Bank, the Texas Department of Insurance closed-claims files,
and other sources. 49 Among other findings, the Milliman Report concluded that the total amount of paid claims in Florida for the year
2000 was more than 150% higher than the amount paid in 1991.50
Paid losses between 1999 and 2000 increased 28%. 51 The Milliman
Report further concluded that while claims frequency nationally remained relatively stable since 1991, Florida claims frequency per
100,000 population increased over the same period from a low of 4.82
in 1991 to a high of 7.56 in 2000.52 The report also concluded that
non-economic damages constituted approximately 75% of awards. 53
The deHaven-Smith Report for the Florida Academy of Trial Lawyers also used the Florida closed-claims database, but excluded hospitals from the analysis. 54 This report concluded that closed-claims
peaked in 1996, but dropped in 1997 and 1998 before beginning an
upward climb again in 1999. 55 While the report concluded that the
amount for paid claims increased 24% between 1999 and 2001, afteradjustments for medical care inflation costs were similar to 1991
levels. 56 This report further concluded that the average claim value,
adjusted for medical inflation, was below that for 1991. 5 7 The deHaven-Smith Report also concluded that there was a 0.11 correlation beresentative data due to selective response rate and lack of empirical validation of the
respondents' asserted behavior. The Governor's Task Force recognized these weaknesses and
we give them no attention in this Article. See generally id.
46. Id. at 117, 124.
47. Id. at 124-34.
48. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 117 (describing the report of RICHARD S.
BIONDI, MILLIMAN USA, INC., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ANALYSIS (2002)).
49. Id.

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 117-23. 131-32.
Id.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 134.

54. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 124.

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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tween economic and non-economic damages, and that claims
58
involving large payments were rare.
The Task Force independently examined these two reports and
identified a number of methodological differences between them, including methodological flaws. 59 The Milliman Report focused primarily on the time period from 1999 through April 2002 and considered
only claims involving indemnity payments. 60 In contrast, the deHaven-Smith Report included claims resulting in no payment, but methodological details of how this was accomplished, the Task Force
concluded, were not reported. 6 1 The Task Force also concluded that
the inflation adjustments in the deHaven-Smith Report probably
overstated the cost of medical care by using the Medical Care Cost
Index. 62 Additionally, the use of Pearson correlations to assess the
relation between economic costs and non-economic costs did not take
63
into account the influence of correlated variables or prove causation.
We do not propose to offer additional methodological critiques of
either of these studies. The major methodological problems in these
two studies and their generally opposite conclusions clearly demonstrate the need to obtain a neutral and accurate picture of how the
medical malpractice litigation system actually operates in Florida.
III.
A.

THE DATA

Florida Closed Claims Files

Since 1975, the State of Florida has required medical liability insurers to file a report on the closing of each claim file. The resulting
database is maintained by the Florida Department of Health. 6 4 The
files are public information. The original archive file, which covered
the time period from 1975 through the first half of 1999, consists of
59,573 closed claims. 65 The second file, starting in the second half of
1999 and continuing through 2002, consists of 4,798 cases. 6 6 Our present research is based on reported closed claims for the fourteen-year
period from 1990 through 2003, a total of 31,521 cases.
58. Id. at 124, 127. The deHaven-Smith Report labeled them "severe claims." Id.
59. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 129-44.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 128.
Id.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 129-44.
Nye et al., supra note 30, at 1512.
See supra note 29.
Id.
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Until 1997, insurers were required to report claims resulting in no
payment to the claimant as well as report paid claims. 67 After 1997,
they were required to report only paid claims, 68 although some insurers continued to report the no payment claims. 69 The original statute
and the reporting form based on the statute contained sixty-three
items bearing on the claim. 70 A series of minor revisions were made
in the 1990s and in the early part of the 2000s. 71 It now contains over
seventy items, although a few of the items are typically left blank. 72 A
listing of the variables contained in the two databases are contained in
Appendices A and B to this Article.
The files contain both numeric ratings, or codes, and prose descriptions of certain events relevant to the lawsuit. In addition to basic
information about the health care provider, insurer, location, and date
of the injury, the files contain information about the nature of the
claimant's injury, age, and gender. For privacy reasons, the files omit
the names of patients. Of particular interest to the present Article,
the data also contain information about how the claim was resolved
and the procedural stage at which it was resolved, including claims
settled without resort to a formal lawsuit. The files contain data bearing on not only the amount of payment made by the primary liability
insurer to the claimant, but also deductibles paid by the health care
provider and amounts paid by excess insurers. A portion of the files 73
contains separate estimates of the claimant's past as well as future
medical expenses, and past as well as future income losses and noneconomic losses (these latter costs are often called "pain and suffering"). 74 The data also contain information on how much the insurer
67. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.912 (West 1996) ("Each self-insurer under s. 627.357 . . . shall

report in duplicate to the Department of Insurance any claim or action for damages for personal
injuries claimed to have been caused by error, omission, or negligence in the performance of
such insured's professional services or based on a claimed performance of professional services
without consent... ").
68. In May 1998, Florida section 627.912 was changed to eliminate the reporting requirement
for claims with "a final disposition of a medical malpractice claim resulting in no indemnity
payment on behalf of the insured." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.912 (West Supp. 1999). The statute
was amended again in September 2003 to reinstate the requirement; the current version can be
found at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.912 (West Supp. 2005).

69. In September of 2003, insurers resumed reporting the nonpaid claims. However, the results from the change will not be visible until one full year of such reporting has occurred.
70. See infra app. A.
71. See infra app. B.
72. See infra app. B.
73. Under the statute, this information should be in all files, but apparently, strict adherence
to this aspect of the statutory requirement is not enforced. See infra note 84 and accompanying
text.
74. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.202(7) (West 1996). The statute defines non-economic damages as
"nonfinancial losses which would not have occurred but for the injury giving rise to the cause of
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paid for legal representation. Other legal costs, including the costs of
experts, are reported as a separate variable.
B.

Limitations of Closed Claims

It is important to outline some of the limitations of the closed-claim
files. They are not comprehensive of claims involving all health care
providers. The Task Force reported that some parties claim that not
all insurers comply with the statute. 75 Certain health care professions
are not covered. 76 Certain neurological injuries sustained during birth
are diverted to the Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation
Plan.77 Not all physicians are represented in the data because they
have opted not to buy liability insurance by signing a nonrevocable
letter of credit to cover any medical negligence injuries suffered by
their patients. 78 In 2003, over 600 Florida doctors opted for this alter79 As already mennative means of maintaining a medical license.
tioned, after 1997, insurers were no longer required to report claims
resulting in nonpayment, although the requirement was reinstated
with an amendment in 2003. For this Article we have not separated
hospitals or other institutional health care providers from individual
health care providers.80
action, including pain and suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, and other nonfinancial losses." Id. Pain and
suffering is often a mischaracterized synecdoche for non-economic damages. See generally Vidmar et al., supra note 26. In some states, they are synonymous. In Florida, however, non-economic damages represent all the elements above. Therefore, we will continue to use the label
non-economic damages.
75. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 135.
76. For a full list of what is included, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.912(1) (West 1996).
77. See David M. Studdert et al., The Jury Is Still In: Florida's Birth-Related Neurological
Injury Compensation Plan after a Decade, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 499, 500 (2000).
78. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.320(i)(c) (West. Supp. 2005).
79. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 108 (stating that 600 Doctors and 128 Osteopathic
Physicians also opted to sign a nonrevocable letter of credit).
80. Claims frequently involve more than one health care provider. Before July 1999, the
closed-claim data reported each health care provider as a separate claim, although it arose out of
the same incident. This was true whether any payment was made on behalf of the provider and
even if the same insurer represented the providers. This would, of course, inflate the number of
claims while decreasing the average indemnity paid. Consequently, we identified some claims
using the Office of Insurance file number, and combined all providers affected by a single claim
into one claim. After June 1999, each separate provider's claim file reflected the total amounts
for the claim regardless of the number of professionals involved or the apportionment of the
claim. Again, this would result in an over-counting of claims. In these cases, all duplicate files
were identified by the insurers' claim number, marked, and removed from the analyses. However, it has become evident that duplicates remain within the dataset, and that meticulous lineby-line assessment will be necessary to cull additional errors. However, for the purposes of this
Article, we have decided to remove only exact matches for the sake of consistency. In short,
there is an unquantifiable amount of noise in the data.
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In carefully scrutinizing the data, we found coding errors and cases
involving several defendants coded as separate cases, and we corrected for these redundancies. A close inspection of the files indicated that either the majority of closed-claim files do not contain a
breakdown of payouts into medical, income, and non-economic losses
or that the data were incompletely reported or entered despite the
fact that they are included in the list of variables provided by the Florida Department of Insurance."' Only 2,117 files of 21,116 paid
claims-10%-contained a breakdown of the elements of the damages that include both economic (i.e., past and future medical costs,
past and future income losses, and other losses) and non-economic
losses. For a disproportionate number of cases, including cases that
were labeled as having Permanent Severe and Permanent Major physical injuries (Levels 7, 8, and 9 on the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) scale),8 2 the data listed only noneconomic damages, raising questions about accuracy of reporting
since logically severe injuries would entail, at minimum, medical losses
and more than likely income losses in many instances. In fact, while
15,409 files showed some amount in the breakdown columns, in only
10,201 claims-48%-did the figures report equal the amount of payment. Of these, 7,717 reported only non-economic damages and 367
reflected only economic damages. Of the 7,717 cases reporting only
non-economic damages, 42%, or 3,247 cases, involved ratings indicating major permanent injuries or death, that is, cases rated as a 7, 8, or
9 level of injury severity. While minor injuries might result in a payment only for non-economic losses, it is highly unlikely that a successful claimant who suffered from paraplegia because of an adverse
incident would only receive non-economic damages. Medical losses,
at a minimum, would comprise some fraction of the award and in
many instances there would also be income and other losses, including
nonmedical expenses such as modified vehicles or wheelchairs. These
discrepancies constitute a major deficiency in the closed-claim
database because we do not know if these cases are different in important ways from cases without such data. This insight also raises very
81. See infra apps. A & B. Subsequent to our own cleaning of the files we learned that the
Florida Auditor General also found similar problems with the data. See WILLIAM 0. MONROE,
OFFICE OF INS. REGULATION, CLOSED CLAIM DATABASE: OPERATIONAL
AUDIT

(Report No.
2005-031, Sept. 2004), available at http://www.state.fl.us/audgen/pages/pdfFiles/2005-O31.pdf.

We have corrected many of these deficiencies in our sample. Although the database is not perfect, it provides a very detailed look at the overwhelming majority of closed claims. Nevertheless, our own findings, along with those of the Auditor General, offer a caution to other
researchers who might use the raw database for research.

82. For a description of these categories, see infra tbl. 6.
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serious problems for the Milliman Report claim that non-economic
damages constituted approximately 75% of awards, 83 since the calculations in that report were based on a small subsample of cases that
may not be representative of all cases.
Even for the small number of cases reporting breakdowns of the
elements of the damages payment, there are a few major qualifications that have not, to our knowledge, been clearly identified in previous writings about closed-claim files.8 4 Future medical and income
losses are estimates and almost invariably contestable. The closedclaim estimates of economic and non-economic losses suffered by patients are estimates made by the insurers and their legal counsel. Legal claims and potential legal claims take place in the context of the
American adversarial system. Insurers and defense lawyers seek experts who are conservative in estimating medical and income losses
while claimants/plaintiffs and their lawyers seek estimates on the generous side. 8 5 Therefore, it is likely that when insurers report damages,
the estimates are conservative estimates that might well be contested
by claimants and their legal counsel. 86 This insight has a further ramification because non-economic losses are typically calculated by subtracting economic losses from the claimant's total payment. To the
the non-economic
extent that the economic losses are underestimates,
87
inflated.
be
will
claimant
the
payment to
Similar arguments about reporting deficiencies might be made
about insurer estimates of the severity of the injury suffered by the
claimant, information also provided in the closed-claim data. The
88
evaluations are made according to a version of the NAIC scale. The
83. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.

84. One subject for future study is the effect of subrogation and insurance liens on plaintiff
awards. Often, insurance companies or Medicare will have a lien on any payment made to plaintiffs at the end of litigation or settlement. This may greatly affect the overall payment to plaintiffs. Further exploration of this subject is left to a future article.
85. See VIDMAR, supra note 41, at 72-76.
86. To test this hypothesis for the present Article, two experienced plaintiffs' attorneys from
North Carolina who were unfamiliar with the Florida statute were provided with a bare oral
description of the reporting requirement and asked to comment on the probable accuracy of the
figures. Both immediately offered the view that the economic damages would be biased toward
the defense perspective of low economic losses and gave explanations consistent with the adversary bias hypothesis.
87. Additionally, different insurers may make these estimates differently, adding some unreliability into the data that is above and beyond any systematic biases.
88. The NAIC scale was created by the International Standards Organization (ISO) for statistical reporting on the closed claims studies they do for the NAIC every two years. The NAIC
publishes the reports, which is why their name is associated with the scale. While more than one
scale exists, the scale used in the Florida closed-claim reports is the most widely used. Another
article on the nuances of the scale and its application will be forthcoming.
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scale is based on physical injury. A patient who suffered a severe psychological trauma or even psychosis might be classified as suffering
"emotional trauma only" and receive a rating of 1,89 but in reality
the
medical and income losses may be very high. Moreover, the insurer's
closed-claim data rating involves only the "most severe injury." The
patient may suffer from multiple injuries that, in total, render the injury more serious than even the most severe injury. In short, the severity rating entered by the insurer might be contestable as overly
conservative.
Finally, and critically, the data do not speak directly to the contemporary crisis involving assertions by liability insurers that claims
started increasing around the year 2000. As documented below in Table 1, there is a substantial lag time of between three and six years,
and sometimes longer, between a patient's injury, filing of a claim, and
final settlement of the claim. 90 Any increase in claims and the payouts
for those claims beginning in 2000 may not be fully reflected in closedclaim data until the second half of the decade.
All of the above qualifications are important to keep in mind. Nevertheless, the data are the best available and they provide important
insights into the profile of medical negligence claims in Florida. And
to the extent that the contemporary debate revolves around payouts
that liability insurers are making today, the data do speak to the
"crisis."
C.

The Westlaw FloridaJury Verdict File

Westlaw maintains several databases reporting jury verdicts in Florida, including medical malpractice cases. 91 The data report whether
the plaintiff or defendant prevailed at trial, the amounts of verdicts,
and in many instances, the jury's breakdown of the separate elements
of the verdict, such as the specific amount for non-economic damages. 92 They occasionally also report any judicial remittitur or "Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict" (JNOV). Of particular
importance, the Westlaw Data also contain the court docket number,
allowing us to link these cases to the Florida closed-claim files. 93 This
linking will eventually lead us to ask questions about whether and to
what extent eventual payments to claimants are less than the jury ver89. For further illustrations of the NAIC scale, see infra note 124.
90. See infra note 93 and accompanying text; tbl. 1.
91. See supra note 29.
92. Florida juries are required to return itemized verdicts in most civil cases. FLA. STAT. A.
§ 768.77 (West 1996).
93. Since 2001, the docket numbers have been omitted from the files released to the public.
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dicts. Additionally, in some cases with multiple defendants a jury verdict may not fully describe the results of the litigation. For instance, a
plaintiff who failed to prevail against one defendant at trial may still
have received a settlement from a co-defendant who agreed to settle
before trial.
For the present Article, we use these additional data only to illustrate the hypothesis that the NAIC rating of the severity of the patient's injury may underestimate the actual seriousness of the injury.
D.

Summary of Data Limitations

The databases that we use in this Article cannot answer all of the
questions raised in the debate about medical malpractice litigation. In
particular, they cannot address the question of whether medical negligence actually occurred, nor can they provide definitive information
according to some standard on the correctness of settlements or jury
verdicts with respect to liability and amount of damages awarded to
prevailing claimants. The data can, however, develop the major outlines of medical negligence claiming and litigation, including frequencies, costs, and stages at which disputes are resolved. The profile
developed from these data provides answers to many questions from
the current debate-at least as it pertains to the State of Floridaregarding the frequency of claims and costs associated with claims of
medical negligence. We proceed in this task by addressing various
questions related to litigation patterns and outcomes. Throughout, we
will note qualifications imposed by deficiencies in the data sets.
IV.

PRELIMINARY ISSUE: TIME FROM CLAIM TO DISPOSITION

The time from the injury to a final disposition for the claimant is
interesting in its own right. It reveals important information regarding
the time elapsed between the injury occurrence and receipt of payment. This information also bears directly on ancillary issues such as
94
business cycles and the profits of medical liability insurers, although
that topic is not pursued in this Article. The information also sets the
stage for interpreting other analyses that follow in this Article. Table
1 reports the distribution of times to disposition for cases in which a
payment was made to the claimant. Information on claims closed
without payment was not calculated because data on nonpayment
claims were not reported past 1998. Disposition time has been
rounded up to the next year to simplify the data. Almost half (46%)
94. See generally TOM

BAKER,

INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY

(2003).
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of cases were closed within three years and 96% were closed within
six years.
TABLE 1: YEARS TO DISPOSITION (ROUNDED)
CLAIMS RESULTING IN PAYMENT

AND NUMBER OF

(1990-2003)

Number of Claims

Cumulative
Number of Paid
Claims

1

1,773

1,773

8.40%

2

3,354

5,127

24.28%

3

4,703

9,830

46.55%

4

4,841

14,671

69.48%

5
6

3,170

17,841

84.49%

1,644

19,485

92.28%

7

822

20,307

96.17%

8

430

20,737

98.21%

9

161

20,898

98.97%

10

83

20,981

99.36%

11

69

21,050

99.69%

12

34

21,084

99.85%

13

14

21,098

99.91%

14

5

21,103

99.94%

15

6

21,109

99.97%

Years to
Disposition

Cumulative
Percent of Claims

16

4

21,113

99.99%

17

1

21,114

99.99%

18

1

21,115

99.99%

21

1

21,116

100.00%

21,116

21,116

100.00%

Grand Total*
*Two cases lack injury date.

There is reason to be suspicious about cases recorded as taking a
decade and a half or longer to resolve. Some of these may be a result
of recording errors. It is possible, however, that some injuries that
were not subject to tolling under a statute of limitations might be represented in some of those claims. For example, there is a case involving a birth injury that took twenty-one years to resolve. A young
adult probably discovered that a health care provider was negligent at
her birth, but only filed a claim many years later. On the other hand,
for some cases, the apparent length of time could be the result of a
coding error regarding the time of the incident. Regardless of these
outlier cases, Table 1 shows that the mean and median times to close
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cases were just slightly over three years and more than 92% of claims
resulting in payment were closed at the end of five years.
It is also important to ask if disposition time varied by year. Table 2
reports average annual disposition times for all paid claims. Further,
Table 2 shows that disposition times for all paid claims averaged about
three and one-third years from the reported date of the incident to a
closed claim. Disposition times did not change substantially over the
fourteen-year period. The standard deviations indicate that twothirds of these claims were settled between approximately 1.5 and 5.2
years. 95
TABLE

2:

AVERAGE ANNUAL DISPOSITION TIME FROM INCIDENT
TO DISPOSITION: PAID CLAIMS

(1990-2003)

Disposition Year

Number of Cases

Mean Number of
Years to
Disposition

1990

1,289

3.58

2.07

1991

1,328

3.48

1.86

1992

1,191

3.30

1.86

1993

1,231

3.30

1.85

1994

1,321

3.31

1.85

1995

1,640

3.23

1.80

1996

1,807

3.23

1.81

1997

1,758

3.19

1.81

1998

1,713

3.20

1.76

1999

1,470

3.29

1.83

2000

1,538

3.39

1.93

2001

1,552

3.36

1.96

2002

1,620

3.29

1.70

2003

1,658

3.50

1.78

Grand Total

21,116

3.32

1.85

Standard
Deviation

95. The standard deviation is a statistical measure that describes the variability of a distribution of scores around the mean, or average, score. One standard deviation encompasses two
thirds of the scores on either side of the mean. See generally David H. Kaye & David A. Freed-

man, Reference Guide on Statistics, in FED.
EVIDENCE 174 (2d ed. 2000).
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FREQUENCY OF CLAIMS AND AMOUNT3
OF PAYOUT TO CLAIMANTS

A.

Frequency of Claims: 1990-2003

To obtain a complete picture of medical negligence claims, we
would like to learn about not only the total number of claims, but also
the frequency of claims in which the claimant/plaintiff received money
versus claims resulting in no payment to the claimant/plaintiff. Table
3 reports the nonpaid claims through 1996 and the paid claims through

2003. Unfortunately, beginning in 1998, nonpaid claims were no

longer systematically reported in the database. 96 We hypothesize that

some insurers started to omit reporting of nonpaid claims in 1997 in
anticipation of the 1998 changes. But as of this writing, we have not
found enough data to confirm our hypothesis, and thus include the
1997 data in Table 3. We therefore ask questions about nonpaid

claims from 1990 through 1997.
TABLE

3:

FREQUENCY OF CLAIMS BY YEAR AND PERCENTAGE OF
CLAIMS RESULTING IN PAYMENT
Percent of Claims Resulting

Year

Reported Total Claims

in No Payment

Total Paid Claims

1990

2,776

53%

1,289

1991

2,383

44%

1,328

1992

2,293

48%

1,191

1993

2,148

43%

1,231

1994

2,394

45%

1,321

1995

2,831

42%

1,640

1996

3,093

42%

1,807

1997

2,882

39%

1,758

1998

2,289*

*

1,713

1999

1,510*

*

1,470

2000

1,577*

*

1,538

2001

1,609*

*

1,552

2002

1,673*

*

1,620

2003
2,063*
*
1,659
* After 1997 the total claims data and the no payment claims data
become unreliable because
claims resulting in no payment were not required to be reported from 1998 through 2002.9 7
96. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. Close examination of the data indicates that
claims of no payment are reported for those cases that resulted in extended litigation even if the
final outcome was favorable to the defense.
97. If we assume that the insurance companies are dropping the reporting of nonpaid claims
over time, then the increase between 1999 (two years after mandatory reporting) and 2003 may
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Table 3 indicates that there was no consistent increasing trend in
total claims between 1990 and 1997 (the last year for reporting all
98
claims), although there was fluctuation from year to year. For this
period, the mean frequency of total claims was 2,600 cases per year.
The reported nonpaid claims during the period averaged approximately 45% per year and show a slight, but statistically significant99decrease in their proportion of total claims between 1990 and 1997. It
is tempting to extrapolate and argue that the same paid to unpaid reit
lationship existed in subsequent years, but it is also possible that
100
matter.
this
on
further
go
to
changed. The data do not allow us
Next consider only paid claims. Table 3 reports these data for all
fourteen years. The average number of paid claims was 1,508 per year.
From 1990 through 1996, the number of paid claims increased steadily
but then began a modest decline. Comparing the first four years of
the 1990s decade (i.e., 1990-1993) with the first four years of the 2000
decade (i.e., 2000-2003) shows that the annual number of paid claims
moved from an average of 1,260 paid claims to an average of 1,592, an
increase in frequency of 26%. Thus, there was an increase in the number of claim payments. 10 1
However, this percent increase needs to be compared to increases
in population and number of health care providers. Table 4 reports
the number of paid claims by settlement date and paid claims by date
10 2 First, consider settlement
of injury adjusted by annual population.
date. Calculating the population change from 12,938,071 in 1990 to
17,019,068 in 2003 yields a population growth of 4,080,997 persons, or
be an early sign that there is going to be a real rise in claims during the next few years. But cf.
Stephen L. Goldstein, Refreshing Honesty, SUN SENTINEL (FORT LAUDERDALE, FL.), July 23,
2003, at 21A, LEXIS, News, Sun Sentinel (Fort Lauderdale).
98. Pearson's correlation coefficient: r = 0.53, t-test of correlation coefficient: t = 1.54, df= 6,
p < 0.20 n.s.
99. Pearson's correlation coefficient: r = -0.84, t-test of correlation coefficient: t = 3.78, df = 6,
p < 0.01. The 1990 figure appears aberrant. We have no verifiable explanation for the aberration, but suspect it is related to a change in data submission or data entry rather than a substantive difference in claims outcomes.
100. Florida DOI file "#MPLReadme.doc" provided with the database states: "Neither the
Department of Financial Services nor the State of Florida accepts legal liability or responsibility
for the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of this information on closed claim reports filed by
insurers. This information is unaudited. Any conclusions drawn from it should be sensitive to
the fact that the Department of Financial Services does not attest to its completeness or accuracy." #MPLReadme.doc (on file with the DePaul Law Review).
101. t-test for two means: t = 7.94, df = 6, p < 0.001.
102. Population data were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. See http://www.census.gov/
2 004
3
-01.
popest/archives/1990s/ST-99-0 .txt; http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-EST
pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
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31.5%. The fourth column in Table 4 reports the payment cases per
100,000 persons by year.
TABLE

4:

ANNUAL PAID CLAIMS BY SETTLEMENT DATE AND
BY

DATE OF INJURY PER 100,000 POPULATION

Year

Florida
Population

Paid Claims
Frequency
by
Settlement
Date

1990

12,938,071

1,289

9.96

1,336

10.33

1991

13,258,732

1,328

10.02

1,442

10.88

1992

13,497,541

1,191

8.82

1,501

11.12

1993

13,730,115

1,231

8.97

1,582

11.52

1994

14,043,757

1,321

9.41

1,624

11.56

1995

14,335,992

1,640

11.44

1,768

12.33

1996

14,623,421

1,807

12.36

1,703

11.65

1997

14,938,314

1,758

11.77

1.559

10.44

1998

15,230,421

1,713

11.25

1,398

9.18

1999

15,580,244

1,470

9.44

1,317

8.45

2000

15,982,378

1,538

9.62

-

2001

16,355,193

1,552

9.49

2002
2003

16,691,701
17.019.068

1,620
1.658

9.71
9.74

Paid Claims
per 100,000
Persons by
Settlement
Date

Paid Claims
Frequency
by Injury
Date

Paid Claims
per 100,000
Persons by
Injury Date

These data show that while the per capita payment fluctuated over
the period, with an apparent increase starting about 1995 and a decrease beginning in 1999, the per capita number of paid claims
dropped. In fact, during the first four years of the twenty-first century, per capita paid claims were at approximately the same level as a
decade before. 0 3
The settlement date could possibly be misleading because, as Tables
1 and 2 illustrated, settlements occur in most cases between three and
six years after the injury. We conducted an additional analysis comparing actual injury dates against size of population. The most recent
years (1998 forward) cannot be analyzed reliably because a substantial
number of claims arising out of injuries during those years are still
103. The mean claims for 1990-1994, 1995-1998, and 1999-2003, respectively, were
9.44,
11.71, and 9.60 per 100,000 persons. The 1990-1994 means and the 1999-2003 means
were not
statistically different from one another as assessed by t-test comparisons but each
was statistically significant from the 1995-1998 mean at the 0.001 level of probability. We do
not at this
time have an explanation for the increased claims frequency during the 1995-1998
period.
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awaiting settlement. These data are reported in the last two columns
of Table 4. The basic per capita pattern is approximately the same as
for settlement date except shifted back in time.
can be
Another criterion by which changes in payment frequency
10 4
5 reTable
assessed is the number of licensed doctors in Florida.
ports these data, although the statistics were missing for 1991 and are
not yet available for 2003. These data show that the number of licensed doctors in Florida increased annually at an average rate of
3.5%. Payments per 100 doctors were at their highest in the years
1995 to 1997 but in the first three years of the twenty-first century, the
payments per 100 doctors were fractionally lower than a decade
before. 0 5
Figure 1 graphically reports the data discussed in Tables 3 through
5. One line shows the population growth in Florida from 1990
through 2003. Another shows the frequency of payments per 100,000
persons, and the third line shows the frequency of payments per 100
doctors.
The conclusion to be drawn from Tables 3 through 5 and Figure 1 is
that paid claims frequency increased over the period examined in this
Article. When the frequency of paid claims is compared to the increases in population and in doctors, the data indicate that, except for
a period in the mid-1990s, paid claims frequency actually remained
stable.
Keep in mind the caveat, discussed earlier, that the data involve
closed claims. As a result, any increase in claims beginning in 2000
will not be fully reflected in closed claims until the second half of the
decade, that is, beginning about 2006, because of the time lag between
filing and closing of claims.

104.

PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION

IN THE U.S.

(AMA Press 1991-1992,

of licensed
2003-2004). Two caveats are necessary in interpreting this table. First, the number
as an
doctors
licensed
treat
we
but
doctors,
practicing
of
number
the
than
doctors may be higher
care
imperfect proxy for the number of practicing doctors. Second, hospitals and other health
use
simply
and
fact
this
acknowledge
We
suits.
malpractice
in
defendants
facilities also become
number of doctors as a surrogate for those corporate defendants.
105. The mean claims for 1990-1994. 1995-1998, and 1999-2003, respectively, were 3.60, 4.21,
the
and 3.31 per 100 physicians. A t-test on the means revealed that the difference between
the differ1990-1994 mean and the 1995-1998 mean was statistically significant at the 0.01 level;
The
ence between the 1995-1998 and the 1999-2003 mean was significant at the 0.001 level.
0.06
the
at
significant
was
mean
1999-2003
difference between the 1990-1994 mean and the
that
level, just missing the commonly accepted standard of 0.05. It is appropriate to conclude
than
1999-2003
in
physicians
100
per
claims
of
there was a trend toward a slightly lower number
during the 1990-1994 period.
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NUMBER OF DOCTORS, PAID CLAIMS, AND PAID CLAIMS
PER 100 DOCTORS

Year

Number of
Doctors

Percent Increase
in Doctors over
Previous Period

Payment cases

Payment cases
per 100 Doctors

1,289

3.98

1,328

--

1990

32,425

1991

*

1992

34,690

7.0%*

1,191

3.43

1993

36,142

4.2%

1,231

3.41

1994

36,821

1.9%

1,321

3.59

1995

38,918

5.7%

1,640

4.21

1996

40,450

3.9%

1,808

4.47

1997

41,855

3.5%

1,758

4.20

1998

43,297

3.4%

1,713

3.96

1999

44,917

3.7%

1,470

3.27

2000

46,013

2.4%

1,538

3.34

2001

47,305

2.8%

1,552

-

3.28
2002
48,706
3.0%
1,620
3.33
*Data not available for 1991, and thus, the 7% increase between 1990 and 1992 represents
two
years.

B.

Mean and Median Amount of Payment for Paid Claims:
1990-2003

Even if paid claim frequency, adjusted for population and physician
growth, did not increase over the period, the mean and median
amount of payment per year for paid claims may have increased. In
calculating these amounts, we consider not only the amount paid by
the primary insurer but also any deductible paid by the insured and
any amount paid by an excess insurer.1 0 6 Table 6 reports the mean,
standard deviation, and median total amount paid per paid claim by
year. The amounts are converted by the Consumer Price Index to
07
2003 dollars.'
106. The closed claims from 1975 through the first half of 1999 each report the amount paid
by
the primary insurer, any deductible paid by the health care provider, and any amount paid
by the
excess insurer.
107. Inflation adjustments are difficult to calculate in a totally satisfactory way. While
past
medical and economic losses are straightforward-they can be adjusted by the Consumer
Price
Index (CPI)-future economic and medical costs are problematic because the inflation rate
for
medicals is higher than for other economic losses. Each figure could be adjusted separately
in
the data, that is, the medical inflation rate for future medical losses and the CPI for other
economics. However, this is problematic for two reasons. First, the majority of the closed claims
do
not separate medical from lost income and the non-economic portion of awards. Second, when
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FIGURE 1: POPULATION, AND PAID CLAIMS BY DATE
YEAR
SETTLEMENT PER CAPITA AND PER PHYSICIAN BY

(1990-2003)
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*

Payment Cases per 100,000 persons

Payment cases per 100 Doctors

First, consider changes in mean payments. There is some fluctuain
tion from year to year, but there is an unmistakable upward trend
of
period
mean payments. For instance, if we consider the three-year
was
1991 through 1993, the average mean payment to paid claimants
$217,597. A decade later, the mean payment in a similar three-year
period (i.e., 2001 through 2003) was $275,496. This is a 27% inflation8
payadjusted increase. 10 Mean statistics can be influenced by outlier
innot
ments that are very large or very small. Median statistics are
of
fluenced by outlier payments and provide an alternative way
over
averaged
payments
median
looking at changes in payments. The
1991 through 1993 amounted to $78,860, while the median payments
1 0 9 Both
for 2001 through 2003 averaged $128,789, a 63% increase.
mean and median statistical results indicate that the payouts increased
substantially since the early 1990s.
costs, they often adjust
plaintiff and defense experts assess future economic and non-economic
settled for using the CPI as
for inflation. Recognizing the potential error in any adjustment, we
the Bureau of Labor Statisour index of inflation and set it in terms of 2003 dollars. Data from
1, 2004).
tics is available at http://ww.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm (last visited Nov.
108. t-test for two means: t= 3.02, df = 4, p < 0.05.
109. t-test for two means: t= 3.62, df = 4, p < 0.05.
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6: FREQUENCY, MEAN PAYMENT PER PAID CLAIM,
STANDARD DEVIATION, AND MEDIAN: By YEAR

TABLE

Year

Frequency

Mean Payment

Standard
Deviation

1990

1,289

$176,603

$347,401

1991

1,328

$218,140

$392,774

$ 48,517
$ 80,046

1992

1,191

$222,428

$424,260

$ 74,687

1993

1,231

$212,223

$449,379

$ 81,848

1994

1,321

$211,262

$344,579

$ 91,898

Median Payment

1995

1,640

$228,919

$473,973

$ 89,243

1996

1,807

$240,841

$497,220

$113,699

1997

1,758

$224,674

$410,308

$101,700

1998

1,713

$191,834

$320,371

$ 83,685

1999

1,470

$268,955

$635,770

$109,440

2000
2001

1,538

$259,837

$804,428

$106,040

1,552

$238,288

$515,508

$103,362

2002

1,620

$287,920

$554,220

$133,033

2003

1,658

$300,280

$617,673

$150,000

C. Alternative Explanationsfor Payment Increases
One hypothesis to explain this finding is that settlements and jury
verdicts have increased independently of any reasonable cause. That
is, juries became more generous and the generosity inflated settlement
values. A second hypothesis is that the actual costs of injuries increased, possibly because the costs of future medical care increased
(e.g., treatments cost more; patients are expected to live longer following the injury, thus affecting both medical care and lost income
estimates).
There is, however, another possible explanation involving the types
of claims that were closed. Assume that the number of claims involving more serious injuries increased during the period. Even with no
increase in the amount paid for each level of injury, we should expect
amounts of damages to increase.11o
Consider a simple example by way of illustration: Make the assumptions that economic losses are paid directly in proportion to severity of
injury and that there is no inflation over time. Level 4 claims are
110. Case mix is an important consideration in asking about changes in
claim and verdict

patterns. See generally Neil Vidmar, Pap and Circumstance: What Jury
Verdict Statistics Can Tell

Us About Jury Behavior and the Tort System, 28

SUFFOLK

U. L. REV. 1205 (1994).
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worth $100 and level 8 claims are worth $1000. At Time 1, there are
eleven claims to be paid. Six of the claims are at severity level 4 and
five are at severity level 8. The mean payout for all eleven cases
would be: (6 x $100 = $600) + (5 x $1000 = $5000) divided by eleven
claims = $509 per claim. At Time 2, the rate of payment per claim has
not changed and there are still only eleven cases but the mix of severity has changed; now there are five cases at severity level 4 and six
cases at severity level 8. The mean payout for all eleven cases would
be: (5 x $100 = $500) + (6 x $1000 = $6000) divided by eleven claims =
$590 per claim. The mean payment per claim increased 16% between
Time 1 and Time 2, even though there was no change in payment rate
per case. In short, the 16% jump in mean payment can be attributed
to the changing mix of cases. Note also that the median for the eleven
cases changed. At Time 1, it was $100, and at Time 2, it was $1000.
Using the logic of the above example, we can ask if there was a
change in the mix of claims that resulted in payments. The data set
allows a test of the change hypothesis because each case contains the
NAIC rating of injury seriousness. We initially consider the relationship between injury severity and amount of payment. Table 7 shows
that both median and mean payments had a strong positive relationship to severity of injury, except for death cases (Category 9), when
1
the amount declined.11 The lesser payment for death cases has been
1 12 and reflects, in part, the fact that deceased
shown in other studies
patients do not have expensive future medical bills. Nevertheless,
while death cases tended to result in lower payments than level 6, 7, or
8 injuries, they still tended to involve substantial payments. There
were more death paid claims than any other category, constituting
26.3% of all paid claims. The simple and obvious conclusion to be
drawn from Table 7 is that greater injuries result in larger payments
than lesser injuries (death being a partial exception).
Now we can ask about changes in the pattern of paid claims over
time. Table 8 shows the frequency of each rating of seriousness by
year. The bottom row shows the average percent that each injury
level represents for all years. Interpreting Table 8 is less confusing
than it appears. Reading down column 1, representing "emotional injuries," we see that in the years 2000, 2002, and 2003, the number of
paid claims of level 1 injuries was below the mean of 2.8% for all years
111. Pearson's correlation coefficient: r = 0.91, t-test of correlation coefficient: t = 5.41, df= 5,
t = 6.69, df=
p < 0.001; Pearson's correlation coefficient: r = 0.94, t-test of correlation coefficient:
5, p < 0.001.
Scheduling "Pain
112. See generally Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort:
and Suffering", 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908 (1989).
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INJURY SEVERITY, PAID CLAIM FREQUENCY, MEDIAN

AND MEAN PAYMENT PER CLAIM AND STANDARD

DEVIATION

Injury
Severity Code

Number of
Paid Claims

(1990-2003)

Median
Payment per
Claim

Mean
Payment per
Claim

Standard
Deviation

Unrated

18

$ 90,923

$174,227

$ 230,269

1

577

$ 16,737

$ 55,298

$ 163,468

2

1,173

$ 11,158

$ 34,631

$ 183,064

3

3,484

$ 28,332

$ 66,379

$ 120,821

4

2,131

$ 59,100

$127,399

$ 297,729

5

3,407

$ 85,384

$159,129

$ 367,082

6

2,417

$226,000

$306,209

7

1,294

$297,475

$601,828

$ 397,189
$1,135,010

8

1,063

$324,725

9

5,552

$194,835

$694,427
$289,675

$ 981,995
$ 415,472

Grand Total

21,116

$137,163

$236,119

$ 506,635

(although 2001 was above the mean). Column 2 shows that since
1999, the number of level 2 injuries resulting in paid claims was below
the mean of 5.6% for all years. Moving to level 6 injuries, we see a
slight decline below the mean of 11.5% beginning in the year 2000.
Level 7 injuries in 2002 and 2003 constituted more than two percentage points above the mean of all years. Level 8 injuries for those two
years remained at average frequencies for the period. Level 9 injuries
showed a very substantial change in frequencies in the years 2002 and
2003. Whereas injuries resulting in death over the whole fourteenyear period constituted 26.1% of paid claims, that figure jumped to
30.1% in 2002 and to 31.4% in 2003. Put differently, from 1990
through 2001, the percentage of level 9 injuries averaged 25.5% of
paid claims, but in 2002 to 2003, the percentage of paid claims averaged 30.7%. The 5.2% jump in level 9 claims is statistically
significant.113
One hypothesis to explain the increase in the more serious injuries,
particularly at levels 7 and 9, is that there were more injuries and
deaths resulting from medical incidents. An alternative hypothesis,
however, is that there was a shift in the selection, litigation, and negotiation of claims. Plaintiffs' lawyers, for example, might have changed
the strategies they used in selecting cases to pursue against health care
113. Z-test of two properties: Z = -6.29, n = 21,120, p < 0.001.
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providers.1 14 In turn, these changes in selection strategies might have
been in response to the way that defendants and their insurers contested claims or a reaction to subtle and unknown changes in the legal
environment, including the cultures of law firms and courts.

To clarify the picture further, Table 9 reports the annual average
injury severity levels of paid claims and the average payment per
claim. The data show that average severity of injuries increased more

or less consistently over the period.' 1 5 Similarly, the average payment

also showed a positive change over the period. 116 Severity and pay-

ment were positively correlated over the period and the correlation of
0.82 is statistically significant at the 0.01 level of probability.
TABLE

9:

ANNUAL MEAN SEVERITY OF INJURY AND AVERAGE
PAYMENT OF PAID CLAIMS (1990-2003)

Year

Average Severity Code

Average Payment

1990

5.34

$176,603

1991

5.60

$218,140

1992

5.59

$222,428

1993

5.62

$212,223

1994

5.77

$211,262

1995

5.70

$228,919

1996

5.70

$240,841

1997

5.73

$224,674

1998

5.76

$191,834

1999

5.74

$268,955

2000

5.62

$259,837

2001

5.69

$238,288

2002

6.04

$287,920

2003

6.12

$300,280

Overall Average

5.74

$236,119

For further explication, Figure 3 shows the relationship in graph
11 7

form.

114. See generally KRITZER, supra note 40.
115. The Pearson correlation between year and average severity: coefficient: r = 0. 77, t-test of
correlation coefficient: t = 4.26, df = 12, p < 0.001.
116. The Pearson correlation between year and average payment: r = 0.79, t-test of correlation
coefficient: t = 4.53, df = 12, p < 0.001.
117. Another way to look at the data is to compare the first seven years (1990-1996) with the
last seven years (1997-2003). If we do that, we find that for level 9 injuries during the first seven
years, death claims constituted 24.6% of paid claims, whereas in the last seven years they constituted 27.6% of paid claims, a 3% increase.
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3:

ANNUAL MEAN INJURY SEVERITY AND ANNUAL MEAN
PAYMENT PER CLAIM
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Payment

This finding can be explored further by asking if the amounts paid for
different levels of severity changed over the period. To simplify the
data, severity codes 1 through 3 were combined, severity codes 4
through 6 were combined, and codes 7 through 9 were combined to
represent least, moderate, and most serious levels of rated injury, respectively, and the mean amounts of payment for each level were
compared over the period. Figure 4 presents the results.
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4: ANNUAL INFLATION-ADJUSTED MEAN PAYMENT FOR
LEAST, MODERATE, AND MOST SERIOUS LEVELS OF

FIGURE

(1990-2003)

INJURY
$500,000
$450,000
$400,000
$350,000
$300,000
$250,000

$200,000

A.-

$150,000
$100,000
$50,000

$0
1990

1991
----

1992

1993

1994

Severity Codes 1 to 3

1995
-

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Severity Codes 4 to 6 --*- Severity Codes 7 to 91

.All three levels show an upward trend in the mean amount of payment. For less severe injuries (levels 1-3) and moderately severe injuries (levels 4-6), the trends were statistically significant.1 18 For the
most severe injuries (levels 7-9), the upward trend fell just short of
statistical significance.' 19 At present, we cannot explain the more erratic levels of payment for severe injuries compared to the relatively
smooth upward progression of lesser severity injury payments.
The cause of the upward trend in payments is uncertain. Our decision to adjust the data according to the Consumer Inflation Index
rather than the Medical Inflation Index may account for some of the
trend. 120 Medical inflation has increased at a faster rate than the
CPI.121 Using medical inflation would over-inflate lost income
and
other losses. In any event, medical inflation cannot be ruled out as an
explanation of the upward trend in payments. Another possible ex118. For severity codes 1-3, the Pearson correlation is: r = 0.92, t-test of correlation coefficient: t = 786, df =12, p < 0.001. For moderately severe injuries, the Pearson correlation is: r =
0.77, t-test of correlation coefficient: t = 4.23, df= 12, p < 0.01.
119. Pearson's correlation coefficient: r = 0.47, t-test of correlation coefficient: t = 1.82, df= 12,
p < 0.10 n.s.
120. See supra note 107.
121. The following table shows yearly percentage increase in CPI and Medical CPI from 1991
through 2003:
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planation is that since 1990, plaintiffs' lawyers have progressively
found ways of better documenting, and thus negotiating, losses. This
explanation would suggest that earlier claimants were under-compensated rather than later claimants being over-compensated. The other
explanation has already been mentioned, namely that juries have become more generous in their awards and the "shadow effect" of these
awards has also increased settlement values. At this point, we cannot
distinguish the validity of the alternative hypotheses or the degree to
which each might have contributed to the increase in payments. Nevertheless, we have identified the change in case mix as a heretofore
unidentified factor that probably explains at least some of the upward
trend in the amounts of paid claims.
D.

Million-DollarAwards

Some large payments to claimants occurred in Florida from 1990
through 2003. Large payments are often the focus of debate. Have
they increased in numbers? We separate these cases out for examination. Table 10 reports the number of awards equal to or exceeding
one million dollars according to the rating of injury severity.
As a preliminary matter, consider the million-dollar payments for
claims rated as relatively minor injuries (i.e., severity levels 1-4).
While awards exceeding one million dollars may be understandable
when a claimant has sustained very severe injuries, how can these be
justified with minor injuries? The explanation could lie in simple re122 An alternative explanation is
cording errors misclassifying the case.
Year

CPI

Medical CPI

1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

5.2%
3.5%
4.0%
3.4%
3.5%
3.6%
2.4%
1.4%
2.1%
3.4%
2.4%
1.3%
2.3%

14.1%
11.2%
8.4%
6.5%
6.8%
4.5%
3.4%
3.6%
3.3%
4.3%
4.0%
4.4%
4.2%

(last
Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics is available at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm
visited Jan. 25, 2004).
122. Scrutiny of the cases indicates occasional recording errors. Ultimately, each of the above
cases will be carefully checked against the prose description of the injury and against the
later
Westlaw database (see supra note 29), but this is a very labor-intensive process and awaits a
article.
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TABLE 10: INJURY SEVERITY CLAIMS OVER ONE MILLION
DOLLARS, THEIR PERCENTAGE OF ALL CLAIMS AND
MAXIMUM PAYMENT WITHIN EACH CATEGORY
(AVERAGED OVER

Injury
Severity

Total
Number of
Paid Claims

Number of
MillionDollar Paid
Claims

1990-2003)

MillionDollar Paid
Claims as
Percent of
all Paid
Claims

Mean
Payment of
MillionDollar Paid
Claims

Maximum
Payment of
MillionDollar
Claims
(Real $)

1

577

3

0.5%

$1,809,160

$ 2,000,000

2

1,173

2

0.2%

$3,458,223

$ 5,750,000

3

3,484

12

0.3%

$1,373,373

$ 2,145,150

4

2,131

15

0.7%

$1,938,110

$10,075,831

5

3,407

36

1.1%

$2,265,964

$13,200,000

6

2,417

100

4.1%

$1,643,062

$ 7,000,000

7

1,294

203

15.7%

$2,101,999

$25,000,000

8

1,063

204

19.2%

$2,157,869

$ 9,750,000

9

5,552

226

4.1%

$1 ,630,936

$10,000,000

Total/
Average
Payment

21,116

801

3.8%

$1,921,697

$25,000,000

that, as described earlier,12 3 the NAIC scale focuses on physical injury.
If the patient suffered a severe psychological trauma without major
physical injuries, the case might be misclassified as minor. In other
instances, the recording may be due to the statutory instructions that
only the most serious injury need be noted. In some instances, the
patient may incur multiple injuries that are cumulatively devastating
and warrant a much higher classification. In other instances, professional malfeasance as well as negligence may be at the heart of the
claim.' 24 A subsequent article will analyze these issues in detail.
123. See supra note 88.
124. Some selected examples will help to illustrate this point. They were obtained from a
request for a sample of the original sheets submitted by insurance companies to the Florida
Department of Insurance.
Example 1. The NAIC rating was 7 (Permanent-Major Injury): Claimant was fourteen to
fifteen weeks pregnant. A staff physician indicated that she was larger than her gestational period would indicate, and she was referred to a high-risk clinic for a follow-up sonogram to rule
out the existence of twins. Five months later, a sonogram detected massive hydrocephalus.
Plaintiff underwent a Caesarian section and delivered a baby boy. The child was born with
severe brain damage, resulting in an inability to walk, speak, hold his head up, or perform fine
motor movement. Given the profound nature of his physical and mental impairment, he was not
expected to live more than a few years, at best. This seems understated at a rating of 7. described as "paraplegia, blindness, loss of two limbs, brain damage." Compare this to the level 8
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Next, consider the question of whether million-dollar awards have
increased since 1990 after adjustments for inflation. These data are
reported in Table 11.
Although annual frequency is uneven, Table 11 shows a substantial
increase in the number of million-dollar payments over the period,
with a large jump in 2002 and 2003. The percentage of million-dollar
claims as a percent of all paid claims for the 1990-2001 period was
3.43%, but for the 2002-2003 period it was 5.76%, a 2.33% increase
that is statistically significant. 125 At the same time, the mean milliondollar payment, adjusted for inflation, did not change in a statistically
significant way over the period) 26 The average amount of money
paid to each claimant for claims equal to or exceeding one million
dollars did not increase over the years, but there were more claimants
who received million-dollar payments.
Thus, whether we consider all claims or the subset of million-dollar
claims, we see that the explanation for the increases in mean and median payments that are reflected in Table 6 must be viewed in the
context of a complex claiming environment. That is, the relative envidescription, "quadriplegia, severe brain damage, lifelong care or fatal prognosis." Individually,
the injuries might rate as 7s, but taken together, they result in a far more serious condition.
Example 2. The NAIC rating was I (Emotional Injury Only): Plaintiff claimed that a broken
vascular clamp was left in her ankle area. Defendant claimed that the object was a vascular clip.
Plaintiff complained of pain in the ankle on multiple occasions because of the object left inside
of her. Both sides agreed that there was some serious physical pain in the woman's leg, yet this
injury was listed as emotional only.
Example 3. The NAIC rating was 3 (Temporary-Minor): Plaintiff had a pre-existing history of
depression, unstable and abusive relationships with men, and recurrent migraine headaches. Defendant negligently prescribed unnecessary and addictive medicines to plaintiff. Plaintiff eventually became addicted to these medications and suffered physical and mental impairments.
Defendant preyed upon the weakness and addiction of plaintiff and coerced her into sexual
relations in exchange for defendant continuing to supply plaintiff with mood-altering prescription drugs. Plaintiff contended that the defendant carelessly and recklessly abused and violated
the physician-patient relationship for his own sexual gratification. At trial, defendant admitted
sexual relations, but claimed they were only isolated incidents. Plaintiff presented testimony
from defendant's former employees that he sexually harassed them. Considering the egregious
behavior of the defendant, the injury was not minor and there is a strong possibility that the
psychological injury to a mentally unstable person was not temporary.
Example 4. NAIC rating of 6 (Permanent-Significant): The doctor in this case performed
sixteen unnecessary surgeries on a woman's back. The plaintiff allegedly suffered some neurological deficits as a result. The defendant contended that this was untrue. However, both sides
acknowledged that the plaintiff completely lost sexual function, bowel control, and bladder control. Thus, even though she has four separate injuries each severe enough to merit a 6 rating, the
four are treated collectively as one 6, when arguably the total damage is much greater. Furthermore, the 6 rating does not take into consideration the emotional and physical complications
associated with sixteen unnecessary surgeries and the loss of the ability to have children.
125. Z-test of two proportions: Z = -6.43, n = 21,120, p < 0.001.
126. Pearson's correlation coefficient: r = 0.004, t-test of correlation coefficient: t = 0.012, df12, p < 0.95 n.s.
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11: ANNUAL NUMBER OF MILLION-DOLLAR AWARDS,
MEAN AWARD AND MAXIMUM PAYMENT (1990-2003)

TABLE

Million-

Year

Total
Number of
Paid Claims

Number of
Paid Claims
Exceeding
One Million
Dollars

Dollar Paid
Claims as
Percent of
all Paid
Claims

Mean
Payment of
MillionDollar Paid
Claims

Maximum
Payment
In Real $

1990

1,289

29

2.2%

$1,853,846

$ 3,170,000

1991

1,328

50

3.8%

$1,792,060

$ 3,250,000

1992

1,191

37

3.1%

$1,991,582

$ 5,146,500

1993

1,231

28

2.3%

$2,374,042

$ 6,000,000

1994

1,321

41

3.1%

$1,624,361

$ 3,000,000

1995

1,640

61

3.7%

$1,909,115

$ 7,750,000

1996

1,807

68

3.8%

$1,842,762

$11,750,000

1997

1,758

52

3.0%

$2,006,218

$ 6,000,000

1998

1,713

39

2.3%

$1,726,268

$ 4,000,000

1999

1,470

66

4.5%

$2,276,905

$10,075,831

2000

1,538

73

4.7%

$1,990,631

$25,000,000

2001

1,552

68

4.4%

$1,743,002

$13,200,000

2002

1,620

92

5.7%

$1,902,670

$ 7,000,000

2003

1,658

97

5.9%

$1,923,519

$10,000,000

21,116

801

3.8%

$1,921,697

$25,000,000

Total/
Overall
Mean

ronment produced greater payments per case, and the pool of cases
involving the most serious injuries also increased. Many of these most
serious injuries involved payments of one million dollars or more. It is
important again to provide a reminder that the data in Tables 6 and 11
do not speak to the question of whether the increased claims or the
payments were justified or not justified. On the other hand, they do
strongly suggest that at least a significant part of the increase in mean
payments in 2002 and 2003 is because a greater percentage of more
serious (and, presumably, more costly) paid claims were closed.
VI.

STAGES OF SETTLEMENT

To this point, we have ignored the stages and methods by which
claims are settled. These data are also in the closed-claims reports and
are described in Table 12 along with the percentage of paid claims
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settled at each stage. t27 Table 12 shows that approximately 20% of
paid claims were settled without the claimant resorting to a lawsuit
and more than 6% of claims were settled in arbitration. Most of the
remaining claims were settled before trial. By adding the figures of
stages 6 through 9, we see that only 2.3% of all paid claims went to
trial. Alternatively, if missing data and pre-suit claims are subtracted
from the data, we can conclude that the trial rate for prevailing claimants was 2.9%. Keep in mind that these percentages refer only to
claims resulting in payment. Thus, the trial rate does not reflect cases
in which plaintiffs received no money. Nationwide statistics indicate
12 8
that defendants prevail in between seven and eight cases out of ten.
Trials and trial outcomes will be explored in a subsequent article. The
2.9% figure, however, is important in leading us to consider the role of
the jury trial in claims resulting in payments.
Cases involving large payments (i.e., a million dollars or more) are
presented in Table 13 and yield some interesting insights. First,
eighty-seven claims (10.1% of million-dollar claims) were settled for
an average of almost two million dollars ($1,914,021) without the
claimant formally filing a lawsuit, and an additional thirty-eight cases
were settled following arbitration. Second, only sixty of the 801 million-dollar payments-just 7.5%-followed a jury trial verdict. Put in
the obverse, almost 93% of million-dollar payments to claimants were
settled rather than adjudicated. Over the fourteen years examined in
this Article, thirty-four of the 801 million-dollar cases resulted in payments over five million dollars. Only two were settled following a jury
trial. Five of the 801 cases exceeded ten million dollars but only one
was the result of a jury trial. Of the remaining four cases over ten
million dollars, one was settled in prelitigation negotiations, and three
settled before a trial had commenced. In short, the closing of claims,
127. The files contained 189 cases that were classified either as paid claims without additional
data or as "abandoned" claims. Some of these cases may be results of clerical errors in recording
the data. It is also possible that some of the "abandoned" claims were jury trials lost by the
plaintiff or cases abandoned at a late stage in the litigation process, possibly in mid-trial due to a
summary judgment ruling in favor of the defendant. The statute required reporting of cases with
"a final judgment of any amount, but eliminated the requirement for disposition of any amount."
See supra note 67. In any event, they constitute a small fraction (less than one tenth of one
percent) of the cases and should not have any substantial impact on conclusions. For completeness, however, they are reported in Table 11.
128. THOMAS H. COHEN & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL TRIAL CASES

2001, at 1 (NCJ 202803, Apr. 2004), http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ctcvlc0l.pdf (stating that plaintiffs won in just over one-fourth of medical malpractice trials); CAROL DEFRANCES & MARIKA F.X. LITRAS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL
TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 1996, at 6 (NCJ 173426, Sept. 1999), http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ctcvlc96.pdf (stating that plaintiffs won in just over twenty-three
percent of medical malpractice trials); VIDMAR, supra note 41, at 73
AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES
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STAGE OF PAID CLAIMS, NUMBER OF CLAIMS, PERCENT

SETTLED AT EACH STAGE, AND MEAN PAYMENT

Number of
Claims*
4,216

Stage of Claim
1-Presuit period
2-After arbitration

Percent
Resolved
20.2%

1,314

3-Within 90 days of suit
4-After suit

Mean
Payment
$147,413

6.3%

$174,109

830

4.0%

$196,552

13,683

65.4%

$257,690

5-During trial, before verdict

382

1.8%

$454,414

6-After trial

257

1.2%

$399,855

64

0.3%

$555,044

7-After notice of appeal is filed
8-During appeal

67

0.3%

$825,576

100

0.5%

$619,649

20,913

100.0%

$237,581

9-After appeal
Grand Total

* Data were missing for 183 cases and are not included in the Table.

including those involving million-dollar payments, takes place primarily around the private negotiation table rather than in the jury room.
TABLE

13:

MILLION-DOLLAR PAID CLAIMS: SET-LEMENT STAGE,

NUMBER OF PAID CLAIMS, MEAN PAYMENT,
AND MAXIMUM PAYMENT

Percent of All

Number of
Claims

Million-Dollar
Paid Claims

Mean Payment

1-Presuit period

81

10.1%

$1,914,021

2-After arbitration

37

4.6%

$2,119,068

3-Within 90 days of suit
4-After suit

26

3.2%

$1,495,296

566

70.7%

$1,875,881

5-During trial, before verdict
6-After trial

31

3.9%

$2,391,471

24

3.0%

$2,054,685

7-After notice of appeal is filed
8-During appeal

7
12

0.9%

$2,268,228

1.5%

$2,822,362

9-After appeal

17

2.1%

$1,883,405

801

100.0%

$1,921,697

Stage of Claim

Grand Total

VII.

TRANSACTION COSTS

Transaction costs as well as payments to claimants are an important
issue. Did the costs of defending claims increase over the fourteen-
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year period? First, consider all cases-those resulting in no payment,
as well as in payment, to the claimant. This accounts for the fact that
even when the claimant does not prevail, there are often legal transaction costs involved in defending the claim. These costs include lawyers' fees, as well as additional expenses associated with hiring and
deposing experts.1 29 Because nonpay cases were reported only
through 1996, our analysis is limited to the first eight years. These
data are reported in Table 14. The average cost of defending both
paid and nonpaid claims remained stable over the period. On average, the cost of defending a paid claim was about 1.7 times higher than
a claim resulting in no payment. This should not be surprising. Nonpaid claims tend to be settled, on average, at much earlier stages in the
dispute process than paid claims. Of the nonpaid claims, 71% were
resolved before stage 4 (62% were stage 10-abandoned claims),
while only 31% of paid claims were resolved at the same point. In
addition, claims that went to jury trial in which the defense ultimately
won accrued considerable costs.
TABLE

14:

MEAN TRANSACTION COSTS FOR PAID CLAIMS VS.
CLAIMS WITH

Year

No

PAYMENT

Paid

Paid Claims:

No Payment

No Payment:

Frequency

Mean Cost

Frequency

Mean Cost

Total

1990

1,289

$36,785

1,485

$14,579

$24,880

1991

1,328

$45,826

1,055

$21,436

$35,028

1992

1,191

$38,362

1,102

$18,926

$29,021

1993

1,231

$42,437

917

$25,987

$35,415

1994

1,321

$40,503

1,073

$25,581

$33,815

1995

1,640

$40,265

1,191

$25,550

$34,075

1996

1,807

$38,386

1,285

$23,704

$32,311

1997

1,758

$36,540

1,124

$24,650

$31,903

11,565

$39,719

9,232

$22,205

$31,945

Grand mean

It is unfortunate for a further understanding of transaction costs
that systematic nonpaid claims reporting was discontinued after 1997
because in the earlier period, nonpaid claims had contributed substantially to liability insurer costs. Table 14 indicates that on average there
were 1154 nonpaid claims per year during the eight years. At an average of $22,205 to defend these nonpaid claims, the estimated annual
cost to insurers amounts to $25,624,570.
129. Legal costs for lawyers and costs for experts are reported separately in the closed-claims
files, but for these analyses we combined the two expenses to form a single variable.
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It is extremely important to stress here that nonpaid claims should
not be labeled frivolous claims. Many claims that ultimately prove to
be unfounded begin as credible claims, at least in the eyes of the plaintiff and often in the eyes of the defendant. 130 It is only after a sometimes lengthy period of depositions and other discovery procedures
that the evidence causes the plaintiff to abandon the claim. Nevertheless, the fact remains that insurers accrue substantial costs in defend13 1
ing ultimately unsuccessful claims.
Table 15 reports the annual transaction costs for paid claims over
the fourteen years. At least insofar as paid claims are concerned, Table 15 provides no support for a hypothesis that insurer transaction
costs increased. While they increased somewhat for claims settled in
2003, costs for the immediately preceding years were no different than
costs a decade earlier. The mean transaction cost for paid claims from
1990 to 1993 was $40,853, compared to $39,158 for the 2000-2003 period, a difference that is not statistically significant, 132 but is in direct
opposition to a hypothesis that transaction costs in recent years have
increased.
VIII.

DISPOSITION TIME: SEVERITY AND STAGE OF SETTLEMENT

Time to disposition, as shown in Tables 1 and 2, is substantial. We
can now ask some additional questions about the settlement process.
Does the severity of the injury affect the time to disposition? These
data are reported in Table 16. The table distinguishes between all
claims and million-dollar claims. It shows only a modest increase in
disposition time as injury severity increased. Generally, severe injury
payment claims, including million-dollar claims, tended to take no
longer than cases involving lesser injuries. 33
A further question involves the time to disposition for cases settled
at the various stages of the litigation process. These data are reported
in Table 17 and show the expected progression. 134 In general, cases
that go to trial will take longer to settle than those that settle before
130. See VIDMAR, supra note 41, at 69-92.
131. Of course, plaintiffs' lawyers also incur substantial losses when claims are abandoned or
lost at trial. See KRITZER, supra note 40, at 89.
132. t-test for two means: t = 0.60, df= 6, p < 0.60, n.s.
133. The average time to settlement for cases involving less than one million dollars was 3.36
years, compared to 3.34 years for cases over one million dollars, a non-significant difference: Ztest for two means: t = 0.29, n = 21,120, p < 0.80 n.s.
134. The time to settlement for all paid cases was positively correlated to the stage of settlement: Pearson's correlation coefficient: r = 0.98, t-test for correlation coefficient: t = 11.89, df= 7,
p < 0.001. Time to settlement for million-dollar cases also yielded a positive correlation: Pearson's correlation coefficient: r = 0.91, t-test of correlation coefficient: t = 5.63, df = 7, p < 0.001.
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TABLE

15:

ANNUAL MEAN TRANSACTION COSTS FOR PAID CLAIMS

(1990-2003)
Year

Paid Claims

1990

$36,785

1991

$45,826

1992

$38,362

1993

$42,437

1994

$40,503

1995

$40,265

1996

$38,386

1997

$36,540

1998

$37,487

1999

$39,956

2000

$36,995

2001

$36,100

2002

$39,129

2003

$44,407

Grand Mean

$39,413

trial. On the other hand, a great deal of variation might be expected.
If the case is complicated, discovery and negotiation might take considerable time even though the case settles without trial. In a less
complicated case, the parties might reach an impasse early and proceed to trial on a relatively fast track, ending the case while another
case proceeding to trial is still in the discovery stage.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The data reported in this Article constitute a preliminary inquiry
into the medical malpractice litigation process in the State of Florida.
The findings present some broad outlines relevant to the debate about
the role of the tort system and raise many additional questions that
await further research.
While the absolute frequency of paid claims increased between 1990
and 2003, when the figures are adjusted for population growth or for
number of licensed physicians, per capita claim frequency from 2000
through 2003 was no different than the first four years of the 1990s.
Once again it is very important to stress that the data refer to closed
claims, not new claims. If numbers of new claims actually increased
beginning in 2000, as some sources have said, the payouts for these
claims will begin around 2004. The new claims will reach their full

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:315

16: TIME TO DISPOSITION ACCORDING TO LEVEL OF INJURY

TABLE

SEVERITY (ALL YEARS) OF ALL CASES AND
SEPARATELY, MILLION-DOLLAR CASES
Cases > Million-Dollar
InjurySeverity

All Paid Cases

Only

1

2.76

2.82

2

2.42

5.03

3

2.77

3.10

4

2.92

4.39

5

3.49

3.30

6

3.83

3.96

7

4.01

3.79

8

3.81

3.63

9

3.51

3.16

impact near the end of the decade, since the majority of closed-claim
cases take a minimum of three years to conclude, and less than 10% of
135
paid claims require more than six years to disposition.
TABLE

17: DISPOSITION TIME IN YEARS FOR STAGES OF
1990 THROUGH 2003)

SETTrLEMENT (AVERAGED FROM

Cases > Million-Dollar
Stage of Settlement

All Paid Cases

Only

1 Presuit

1.71

1.81

2 After arbitration

1.82

2.03

3 Within 90 days of Suit

2.53

2.71

4 After suit

3.91

3.71

5 During trial

5.01

5.25

6 After trial

4.60

4.34

7 After notice of appeal

5.40

3.70

8 During appeal

5.98

5.62

9 After appeal

6.70

6.26

The data also indicate that the average yearly payouts for closed
claims increased, particularly around 2002 and 2003. The analyses indicate that the payouts increased whether the injuries were minor,
modest, or major, as assessed by a severity-of-injury scale. This
135. We do not address insurer reserves in this Article; however, Tom Baker's study suggests
that the effect of reserves will be felt much sooner since insurers must set aside enough reserves
to cover claims. See generally

BAKER,

supra note 94.
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change could be due to increased medical costs of injuries or to inflation above and beyond patient economic losses.
However, one of the most interesting and striking findings bearing
on increases in average paid claims is the discovery that in recent
years there has been an increase in the frequency of claims involving
very serious injuries and death. Indeed, in 2002-2003, the number of
closed claims involving deaths jumped more than 5% over previous
years. One explanation is that there was an increase in more serious
medical negligence leading to deaths, but a plausible competing explanation is that around 1996, plaintiffs' lawyers and their clients began
to select and pursue more cases involving deaths during medical treatment. Changes in case selection could result in an increase in mean
overall payments, reflected about three years later, as the claims began to be resolved. Accompanying the increase in paid claims involving serious injuries and deaths was a large jump in payments equaling
or exceeding one million dollars. Of course, if very serious injuries
are likely to produce large economic losses, this increase would be
expected. The present data do not allow us to test the competing hypotheses regarding what changed but the findings certainly call for
research into these phenomena.
Another striking finding is that the vast majority of million-dollar
awards were settled around the negotiation table rather than in the
jury room. Much of the debate about tort reform involves claims
about generous juries and the need for caps on non-economic, or
"pain and suffering" components of jury awards. Yet, of a total of 831
million-dollar-plus payments, only sixty-three, just 7.5%, followed a
jury trial. The rest were settled prior to trial. Indeed, 125 of the 801
cases (15.1%) were settled prior to litigation or settled in arbitration.
Of the thirty-seven claims involving very large awards-payments of
five million dollars or more-only two were claims that went before a
jury. Future articles in our research will focus on jury verdicts and
subsequent settlements, but at this stage, it would seem, debate about
the role of juries in so-called "mega awards" is misplaced insofar as
Florida is concerned.
Finally, the analyses showed no increase in transaction costs for
paid claims over the fourteen-year period. Unfortunately, data on
transaction costs for claims resulting in no payment were not reported
after 1997.
Our data and the conclusions from those data are limited to the
State of Florida. At this point, we have proceeded without attention
to many important distinctions; for example, whether the patterns for
hospitals and similar institutions are different from the patterns for
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individual health care providers. Nevertheless, the present Article
provides important background data bearing on the debate about the
role of the tort system and its effect on the availability of medical
liability malpractice insurance. It sets the stage for additional research, now in progress, and defines parameters around which serious
discussion should take place.

